Science as a Social Construction

Image credit: Elena Dagan

XINYU WANG

Read the Faculty Introduction here.

“The whole of science might be an error!” This astonishing saying comes from the 1959 book The Logic of Scientific Discovery written by Karl Popper, one of the most influential philosophers of science in the 20th century. By extensively criticizing the mainstream scientific methods of inductivism and empiricism, he proposes falsifiability and testability as the only demarcations of science and non-science, thus supporting the notion of absolute objectivity of science. Surprisingly, this striking notion gained wide acceptance among eminent scientists in the middle of the twentieth century. The Nobel Prize winner, Peter Medawar, even states, “There is no more to science than its method, and there is no more to its method than Popper has said” (Mulkay 1). However, does the acknowledgement from prestigious scientists such as Medawar necessarily mean that Popper’s methodology is groundbreaking and worthy of widespread adoption? Especially in an ever-changing era, with more and more intertwined global issues like climate change and public health concerns, is the simple rule of falsifiability still valid and powerful enough to deal with these complex scenarios? This question matters a lot to the future path of the development of science. To answer this question, I will examine Popper’s philosophy of science closely, and bring critics, such as Thomas Kuhn and Bruno Latour, into conversation. By challenging Popper’s pursuit of absolute objectivity in science, I argue that science is a socially-constructed concept, which is affected by factors such as power games and multiple interpretations. These social dimensions influence both the formation and perception of science.

In the first place, Karl Popper denies traditional scientific methodologies, such as empiricism and inductivism, because of “an asymmetry between verification and falsification” (Popper, The Logic 19). Popper argues that traditionally, scientific theories are verified by many successful cumulative experiments. However, in Popper’s eyes, if the results of one of these experiments are faulty, the entire scientific theory is proven false. In this sense, “theories are therefore never empirically verifiable” because it is always possible for “an empirical scientific system” to be refuted by experience (Popper, The Logic 18). Moving away from inductive logic, Popper looks for a criterion of demarcation for scientific epistemology, which turns out to be testability and falsifiability. Following this definition, any scientific theory should have the potential to be disproved with counterexamples. Hence, we can only accept a developed theory tentatively if the current “critical efforts are unsuccessful” and we maintain “an eagerness to revise the theory if we succeed in designing a test which it cannot pass” (Popper, “Conjecture” 28). Furthermore, once the theory is falsified, we regard it as a mistake and abandon it immediately, thus making progress in our scientific discovery. He believes that only in this way can we obtain absolute objectivity in science and distance knowledge from subjective social factors. In Popper’s own words: “I shall try to establish the rules, or if you will, the norms, by which the scientists are guided when he is engaged in research or in discovery, in the sense here understood” (Popper, The Logic 29). Despite his good intention and seemingly reasonable approaches, the concept of falsification is quite problematic and the pursuit of absolute scientific objectivity is unattainable.

By emphasizing unreliable factors in an experimental procedure, the results of an experiment can be proven unsound. Since Popper bases his idea of falsification on the reliability of these experiments, the evidence that Popper uses to reject a scientific theory can also be refuted by using his logic. In response to this critique, he just calls it “a form of metaphysics” and claims that “you will never benefit from experience” in thinking that way (Popper, The Logic 28). This is actually a weak and unconvincing defense, as the point when the theory is truly falsified remains unclear. And the lack of criterion for valid falsification makes everything count as science, as long as we try really hard to reject it using empirical evidence afterwards. In this sense, falsifiability loses its meaning as the demarcation of science and non-science. 

Thomas Kuhn, another great philosopher of science, explicitly denies the validity of falsification from a different perspective. In his book The Structure of Scientific Revolution, he points out that even if falsification is valid in most cases, we cannot use the “emergence of an anomaly or falsifying instance” to reject the whole theory (146). Instead, true falsification is more like “a subsequent and separate process,” which might be called another “verification of a new paradigm over the old one” (Kuhn, “The Structure” 147). To some extent, a successful falsification in Kuhn’s mind should be based on the establishment of a new paradigm. A successful falsification does not necessarily mean that the challenger knows why the old theory is wrong or how the correct one should look. Instead, the over-emphasis on a contingent falsification exempts the scientists from making continuous efforts to build the new paradigm, as it is always easier to find a single counterexample than to establish a whole new system. Even worse, the focus on falsification confines one’s thinking within the others’ seemingly mature model. This adherence makes it even harder to make breakthroughs. Therefore, the excessive emphasis on falsification actually hinders the development of science. From these two aspects, we can clearly see that Popper’s failure to define valid falsification and his over-emphasis on the notion of falsification make his philosophy of science logically flawed. 

These logical fallacies are deeply rooted in Popper’s understanding of how science progresses and how he defines already falsified theories. In his opinion, progress is only made after a developed theory is falsified, which can be considered as a simple linear model. And once the old theory is falsified, it is identified as a mistake. However, most scientific work happens in the process of trying to improve or supplement existing theories, not to falsify them, although falsification may sometimes be the result. Furthermore, many groundbreaking scientific discoveries are entirely independent of previous ones and approach the nature of the world from a completely different perspective. A perfect example would be the relationship between Newton’s Law of Motion and Gravity and Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity. Einstein’s research on the nature of time and space is neither built upon Newton’s theory nor meant to falsify it. However, Arthur Eddington, an English astronomer, observed the contradiction between the two systems and proved Einstein’s theory to be more accurate (Valtonen 44). Following Popper’s definition, Newton’s theory should be identified as a mistake and abandoned thereafter. But, in fact, Newton’s theory is still taught everywhere and helps people understand motion and gravity, as it can apply to most cases in our daily lives. It is unfair to say that we are passing down a meaningless mistake from generation to generation. 

Besides the theory’s absolute accuracy, other social aspects, such as usefulness to society and its courage of innovation, should also be considered when we decide whether to preserve or abandon the theory. Even already abandoned and outdated theories, such as Ptolemaic astronomy and Phlogiston theory,¹ should not be characterized as mistakes, but as “an amazing piece of puzzle solving” (Kuhn, “Logic of Discovery” 11). The way they organized available data was perfectly scientific at that time. Those who make “mistakes” in science are actually brave scientific innovators, who describe and explain nature to the best of their abilities. The neglect of other possible development models and the rejection of predecessors shows that Popper’s philosophy of science ignores the actual practices of scientific discovery. 

The reason why such a great philosopher of science considers the development of science in such a simple way is that the whole set of Popper’s scientific epistemology is built upon his ideal that science should be detached from society. However, this notion turns out to be impossible, as the development of science inevitably involves human factors, which is proven by Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar in their book Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Science. Based on their careful observation of daily practices inside the laboratory, they found that the production of scientific knowledge in such a comparatively pure and closed space is still “disrupted by the intrusion of external factors” (Latour, Laboratory 21). These factors involve the collision of different ideologies, the conflicts of scientific methodologies, and the personalized interpretation of the specific phenomenon. In order to eliminate the conflicts between methodologies and reach an agreement, scientists need to deploy their persuasive skills, like discussion. Thus, the laboratory can be seen as “the organization of persuasion through literary inscription,” which, according to Popper’s rule of demarcation, belongs to the non-science field (Latour, Laboratory 44). Furthermore, the motivation behind these scientific experiments is also highly intertwined with social factors. When scientists are asked about what motivates them to do science, the most frequent three answers are internal satisfaction, personal credibility, and material rewards (Latour, Laboratory 190). Obviously, the latter two are achieved through active engagement with society. The original incentives for doing science fully illustrate that the intention of most scientific activities is already influenced by social factors from the very beginning. In such a way, social aspects are an inseparable part of science.

Outside of the laboratory, the construction of science is even more complex, as the formation of scientific consensus is no longer limited to the space of a single laboratory. “The interpretative flexibility” is displayed throughout the spread of science (Pinch 409). With this statement, the scholar Trevor Pinch explains that different “social groups,” whose members share “the same set of value,” may develop different opinions towards the same scientific rule based on how the research procedure is narrated and how their personal interests relate to it (Pinch 414). At the same time, this social mechanism also eliminates interpretative flexibility and closes the debate by accepting the one theory that passes the evaluation of the “Core-set” scientists, who are “intimately embroiled in scientific controversy” (Pinch 425). The formation of this Core-set group and the process of evaluation can be very obscure, and inevitably involves many subjective factors. Ironically, what Popper is doing is to influence the “Core-set” scientists’ epistemology of science. He takes a sociological approach to fight against social influence on science. Popper’s attempt fully illustrates that we cannot avoid social aspects when pushing science forward. Thus, we can convincingly conclude that science is defined by people and the cultural environment it exists in.

Since science is deeply affected by these social factors, both the scientists and the public have the obligation to spread science and understand it in a proper way. Otherwise, misunderstanding of science could also cause problems to society in return. For example, if we adopt Popper’s point of view in the problem of global warming, we would say that the claim that it is caused by human beings might be falsified at some point in the future. Thinking in this way, there is no point in us taking preventative measures, as any effort we make today may turn out to be useless later. In other words, “dangerous extremists” can use the “sword of criticism” and take falsification as a valid excuse for our nonfeasance (Latour, “Why” 227). When we push the critical spirit of falsification to the extreme, we may easily slip into the moral hazard about social issues that are inextricable from science. “The lack of scientific certainty” should not always be “the primary issue,” especially when the critical spirit encourages us to “fight the wrong enemy” (Latour, “Why” 231). The uncertainty should not keep us away from the problem; instead, it should encourage us to take a close look at the problem. Popper’s total denial of inductivism and empiricism has driven him down the wrong path. Rather than subtracting these methodologies from the category of scientific approach, he should try harder to explain the conditions under which they might be renewed. Constructive criticism should lead to further possibilities, not merely subtraction; otherwise, it would only impede the progress of science and the often complex implementation of scientific principles and discoveries into society. 

Applying the characteristics of a good criticism, I am also exploring a way to integrate Karl Popper’s philosophy of science into the broader social context. The most valuable insight that Popper provides us is the critical spirit in scientific discovery, but he pushes this notion to the extreme, taking falsifiability as the only criterion. The oversimplification and the overemphasis on falsification would be unrealistic in the actual practice of science, since science is highly intertwined with complex social factors in both its origin and its spread. Therefore, the key is how to apply critical thinking to science properly from a sociological perspective. On the one hand, we should promote this kind of critical thinking to fight against the deliberate manipulation of science and to pursue scientific objectivity. For example, some businessmen urge some so-called scientists to give out certificates and make use of the title of “science” to promote sales of their health care products, which turn out to be useless or even harmful. In this case, truthful and objective scientific knowledge from science education should enable people to see through the trick. On the other hand, objectivity should also be considered in a way that is combined with actual situations to avoid detachment from reality. The pursuit of absolute objectivity can lead to not only moral hazards in global issues, but also problems in cultural encounters. Let’s take “gender” as an example. According to Popper’s philosophy of science, “male” and “female” might qualify as just two categories with clear biological distinctions. By contrast, considering the social perception and construction of “gender,” allows us to see the biases embedded in simplistic dichotomies. Nowadays, “gender” is interpreted in an individualized way with more and more people choosing to define, perceive, and illustrate it in their own ways. Therefore, the awareness of social factors in the construction of science is an important element to help science keep pace with the era and, at the same time, maintain its objectivity in a reasonable way. 

Endnotes

¹Ptolemaic astronomy is the theory that Claudius Ptolemy synthesized to explain the motion of the stars, sun and planets, in which the Earth is in the middle of the rotating universe. The phlogiston theory is a superseded scientific theory that postulated that a fire-like element called phlogiston is contained within combustible bodies and released during combustion.

Works Cited 

Kuhn, Thomas S. “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research.” The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. University of Chicago Press, 1977, pp. 266-92.

—. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Latour, Bruno, et al. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Princeton University Press, 2013.

Latour, Bruno. “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 2, no. 2, 2004, pp. 225–48.

Mulkay, Michael, and G. Nigel Gilbert. “Putting Philosophy to Work: Karl Popper’s Influence on Scientific Practice.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 11, no. 3, Sept. 1981, pp. 389–407.

Pinch, Trevor J., and Wiebe E. Bijker. “The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other.” Social Studies of Science, vol. 14, no. 3, Aug. 1984, pp. 399–441. 

Popper, Karl. “Conjectures and Refutations.” Philosophy of Science A-Z, 2007.

—. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Routledge, 1992. 

Setargew Kenaw. “Psychoanalyzing Historicists?: The Enigmatic Popper.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, vol. 41, no. 2, 2010, pp. 315-322.

Valtonen, Mauri, et al. “From Newton to Einstein: The Discovery of Laws of Motion and Gravity.” Three-Body Problem from Pythagoras to Hawking, Springer, 2016, pp. 31-49.